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THE PRISONER IN A PRIVATE
HOSPITAL SETTING: WHAT
PROVIDERS SHOULD KNOW
JEFFREY NATTERMAN* & PAMELA RAYNE**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prisoner health care rights have long been debated, and accordingly,
there are countless journal articles and judicial decisions describing their
various nuances.1 Despite the scholarship that has penetrated various issues
confronting prisoner medical management, one under-reported subject area
requires further exploration. The privately hospitalized prisoner-patient is
clinically managed based on the same standard of medical care established
for the general population, but the prison context presents additional
complicating factors.2
Medical providers are expected to follow ethical clinical practice
guidelines established by national medical societies, and base their practices
on well-established, evidenced-based metrics. The American Medical
Association (“AMA”) has long established a code of ethics that supports
not only competent medical care for the general population,3 but has
recently advocated for the civil rights of prisoners seeking medical
treatment.4 Nonetheless, for the hospitalized patient in custody, several

Copyright © 2016 by Jeffrey Natterman & Pamela Rayne.
*Jeff Natterman is Associate Senior Counsel for The Johns Hopkins Health System, and is Risk
Manager the Johns Hopkins Hospital.
**Pamela Rayne is Associate Senior Counsel for the Johns Hopkins Health System.
1. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH IN PRISONS: A WHO GUIDE TO THE
ESSENTIALS IN PRISON HEALTH 7–8, 33–41 (Lars Moller et al. eds., 2007) (describing the steps
prisons should take to reduce health risks); Joseph E. Paris, Why Prisoners Deserve Health Care,
10 AMA J. ETHICS 2, 113–15 (Feb. 2008), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/02/msoc10802.html (describing legal and ethical reasons for providing health care to prisoners).
2. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 150–51 (3d ed.
2007).
3. AMA, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medicalethics.page.
4. In Fields v. Smith, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) in an amicus brief
supported the rights of prisoners to obtain hormonal replacement therapy for gender identification
disorder, agreeing with the plaintiffs that to deprive them of this medical intervention would cause
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legal and ethical questions arise that muddy the waters related to
interactions between the prisoner, family, providers, and custodial agents.5
For hospital providers, the initial concern is who consents for basic
treatment and procedures.6 For example, what if the prisoner-patient
becomes critically ill? The consent question becomes more complicated for
the incapacitated or mentally ill prisoner-patient often leaving hospital staff
to wonder: who decides the goals of care and treatment?7 Staff may be
caught in the middle, trying to determine if the family, the warden, or the
medical director of the custodial agency has ultimate authority over the
final decision regarding the patient’s welfare.8 There are questions that
must be addressed when looking at private hospitals. Are private hospitals
considered state actors for constitutional liability purposes since most
receive federal funding that supplies a large part of operating budgets?9
Does a private hospital have a role in coordinating organ donation for a
prisoner-patient?10 After a brief contextual review of prisoner
epidemiology, this article will explore informed consent, organ donation,
and sources of liability for both public and private entities, and suggest
policy parameters to guide providers who may treat prisoners.

“physical and emotional harm.” Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n, Mental Health America, et al., as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 10-2339
& 10-2446).
5. Nancy Dubler, Ethical Dilemmas in Prisons and Jail Health Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/03/10/ethical-dilemmas-in-prison-andjail-health-care/ (outlining various ethical issues that arise for a hospitalized prisoner, including
refusal/denial of care, the doctor-patient relationship, informed consent, and confidentiality).
6. Linda Fleisher et al., A Practical Guide to Informed Consent: What is Informed Consent?,
TEMPLE UNIV. HEALTH SYS., http://www.templehealth.org/ICTOOLKIT/html/ictoolkitpage1.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
7. E. Fuller Torrey et al., The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails:
A
State
Survey,
TREATMENT
ADVOCACY
CTR.
(Apr.
8,
2014),
http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf.
8. See generally Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 15, 2015) (stating that the
courts generally will defer to prison officials in making decisions about prisoners’ rights).
9. Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200–01 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating the instances
where private hospitals are state actors for constitutional purposes: (1) when there is a nexus
between the state and the provider, (2) when the provider acts under state compulsion, and (3)
when the provision of care constitutes a public function).
10. Cf. Andrew M. Cameron et al., Should a Prisoner be Placed on the Organ Transplant
Waiting List?, AMA J. ETHICS (Feb. 2008), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2008/02/ccas20802.html (discussing ethical and legal considerations underlying the question of whether a
prisoner should be placed on the organ transplant waiting list).
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II. GENERAL EPIDEMIOLOGY OF PRISONERS IN THE U.S.
In essence, the total prison population has expanded significantly over
the years,11 and with this expansion comes an understandably higher
incidence of inmate disease requiring medical services.12 The various
jurisdictions are at liberty to determine “how” to deliver care—whether
through hired prison medical staff and contractors, or sending inmates to
private hospitals for specialty or emergency services.13 Of interest to the
private provider is the expectation of being asked to see and treat a larger
number of prisoners than in prior years.14 Interestingly enough, though not
explored in this article, telemedicine may also be a future way in which the
private provider will be asked to consult on prisoner medical matters.15
A. General Numbers of Prisoners
The National Prisoner Statistics (“NPS”) Program has operationalized
the collection of annualized prisoner data through the U.S. Census Bureau
since the early 20th Century,16 but participation in the survey is
voluntary.17 State prisoner population totals, as of the end of 2013, far
outpaced federal prisons in terms of the volume of inmates.18 Specifically,

11. See U.S. Prison Populations – Trends and Implications, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/1044.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (stating that the
number of inmates in American prisons has exceeded two million for the first time).
12. See State Prison Health Care Spending, A REPORT FROM THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
AND THE JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUNDATION 1, 9 (July 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/07/StatePrisonHealthCareSpendingReport.pdf
(detailing statistics regarding the prevalence of disease and mental illness in prisons).
13. See Beth Kutscher, Rumble Over Jailhouse Healthcare, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug.
31, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130831/MAGAZINE/308319891.
14. See Douglas C. McDonald et al., Telemedicine Can Reduce Correctional Health Care
Costs: An Evaluation of a Prison Telemedicine Network, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE
PROGRAMS,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
JUSTICE
14
(Mar.
1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/175040.pdf (showing almost 120 total telemedicine consultations
per month in 1997 compared to 40 conventional in-prison consultations).
15. Id. at 29; Philip S. Schaenman et al., Opportunities for Cost Savings in Corrections
Without Sacrificing Service Quality: Inmate Health Care, URBAN INST. 7 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412754-Inmate-Health-Care.pdf
(describing
how
telemedicine is a way for doctors to speak to their patients remotely, and has the capacity to
increase efficiency and reduce costs).
16. E. Ann Carson, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013 (2014) [hereinafter BJS Prisoners 2013]. This report by
E. Ann Carlson, Ph.D., is a compilation of demographic statistics, including total numbers of
inmates by prison jurisdiction, male/female comparisons, sentenced prisoners, imprisonment rate
per 100,000, and admissions and releases of prisoners for 2012 and 2013. The report also includes
jurisdictional volume data for prisoners held in the custody of private prisons inter alia as well as a
state-by-state analysis, offense data, and military correctional data.
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 2.
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state prisons housed 1,358,875 inmates while federal prisons housed
215,866 inmates for a total prison population of 1,574,741 in 2013.19 2013
saw the first increase in prison population in three years by approximately
4,300 inmates.20 Overall, the total number of prisoners in both federal and
state facilities has risen approximately five-fold since 1978.21 The burden
for assessing, treating, and caring for this large number of prisoners rests
with state and federal governments.22 While there are several options for
providing medical services to prisoners, more states are privatizing medical
services through third party contractors.23 This article does not discuss the
debate over whether privatization of medical services is better or worse for
patient health care. Rather, this article is concerned with prisoner-patients
who are taken outside of contracted services for medical care and addresses
the different sources of liability for state actors and individual physicians.
Often private hospitals are called upon as experts in specialty areas to
treat prisoner-patients, including those in emergency situations.24 While the
NPS collects information regarding the number of prisoners who are
transported to private hospitals for treatment, states furnish this information
on a voluntary basis.25 Thus, there is simply no way of knowing the actual
volume of prisoner-patients in the private setting without an intense
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction survey utilizing cost analysis data or other
coding source through state agencies.26

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
John Schmitt et al., The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y
RESEARCH 10 (June 2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-201006.pdf (stating that federal, state, and local governments combined spent almost $75 billion on
corrections in 2008).
23. See,
e.g.,
Innovative
Correctional
Healthcare,
WEXFORD
HEALTH,
http://www.wexfordhealth.com/index.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2015). Wexford Health Sources,
Inc. was incorporated in 1992 for the purpose of delivering medical services to correctional
facilities. They serve over 97,000 inmates in 120 correctional institutions across the country. Id.
24. See
Patients’
Rights,
WEST’S
ENCYC.
OF
A M.
LAW,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Patients_Rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, passed in order to prevent “patient
dumping” by setting out the criteria for emergency services and the safe transfer of patients
between hospitals); see also Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.
1985) (recognizing that a private health care organization may be liable under a tort theory when
the organization “knew that [specialty] medical care was necessary but simply refused to provide
it”).
25. BJS Prisoners 2013, supra note 16, at 28 (stating that the report’s effectiveness depends
on state participation).
26. Id. (explaining jurisdictional issues and the distinction of “inmates in custody” vs.
“prisoners under jurisdiction,” as well as non-reporting states that may further convolute the data
the author is discussing in this article).
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Even at the state level, available data is not easily acquired, and
sometimes not collected at all.27 In Maryland, the Health Services Cost
Review Commission (“HSCRC”) sets reimbursement rates for hospitals and
collects data related to admissions and discharges.28 Of the hundreds of data
points that are tabulated routinely by the HSCRC,29 none are granular
enough to demonstrate what percentage of inmates in the state utilizes
private resources.30 If the HSCRC is representative of available data on this
topic, it is not immediately clear that prisoner use of private health systems
is publicly reported.31 Recently published evidence suggests, however, that
health care spending has increased related to the burgeoning prisoner
population.32 According to a recent publication by the Pew Charitable
Trusts entitled “Managing Prison Health Care,” a majority of states have
seen a 28% increase in health care spending owing in part to an aging
prison population with underlying diseases brought by them into the
system.33
The Maryland example, however, may provide some insight into the
utilization. The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correction
Services (“DPSCS”) collects basic information on costs and volume of
prisoners who utilize inpatient care, outpatient specialty and surgical care,
and emergency department resources.34 For fiscal year 2014 (FY14), 5,944
prisoners were seen in private settings in those categories.35 In calendar
year 2013 for Maryland, the total number of sentenced prisoners, state and
federal, male and female, was 20,988.36 Though the data collection periods

27. Id. at 28–29 (discussing non-reporting states).
28. Hospital Patient Level Data Submission Requirements and Production Schedules, THE
MARYLAND
HEALTH
SERVICES
COST
REVIEW
COMM’N,
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/hsp_Data.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015); Rate Setting Activities, THE
MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST REVIEW COMM’N, http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/aRates.cfm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
29. See generally Hospital Data and Reporting, THE MARYLAND HEALTH SERVICES COST
REVIEW COMM’N, http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/hsp_Data.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Managing Prison Health Care Spending, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/05/15/managing-prison-healthcare-spending (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). The Pew Charitable Trust analysis of state-by-state
prisoner health care spending showed a 28% median increase in per-inmate spending in 35 of 44
states. Id. The explanation for the increase includes, “Aging inmate populations[,] [p]revalence of
infectious and chronic diseases, mental illness, and substance abuse among inmates, many of
whom enter prison with these problems.” Id.
33. Id.
34. Email sent from The Medical Director’s Office of DPSCS, to Jeffrey Natterman (Nov. 21,
2014) (on file with author) (DPSCS contracts for utilization management).
35. Id.
36. BJS Prisoners 2013, supra note 16, at 5.
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do not exactly correlate between the Maryland methods and the NPS
systems, a general mathematical correlation suggests that approximately 28
percent of prisoners were seen and treated at private facilities in Maryland
during a twelve-month period.37
B. Morbidity and Mortality Data
Comparisons of prisoner mortality rates between the state, federal, and
local institutions cannot be performed with clarity due to the diverse
demographics and health characteristics of each jurisdiction.38 However, in
2012, while the mortality rate in federal prisons declined by 10 percent,
there was no substantive change in the state prison mortality rate.39
In comparing the reported causes of death for local jails and state
prisons, the numbers in the following table represent the statistically
significant rate for each category. Note, however, that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons has not released cause of death information for analysis by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics.40
TABLE 1: REPORTED CAUSES OF DEATH AT LOCAL JAILS
AND STATE PRISONS
AGE AT DEATH
LOCAL JAIL

STATE
PRISON

CAUSE OF DEATH

Suicide
51% were 45
40/100,000
or older
Cancer
81/100,000
55% were 45 Heart Disease
or older
63/100,000

SEX
Males - 87%

Males - 97%

37. Grossly calculating the number of private Maryland visits “x,” or 5,944, divided by the
NPS data for Maryland total prisoners by calendar year “y,” or 20,988, for an estimated value of
28.3%. Infra notes 34–36. This number represents a significant portion of prisoner-patients in the
private setting, but also is fluid because of the lack of data collection on this topic. Id.
38. See Margaret E. Noonan & Scott Ginder, Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisoners,
2000-2012-Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0012st.pdf
[hereinafter BJS Mortality 2012].
39. See id. at 3. According to the report, there was a total of 3,351 deaths in state prisons
while local jails saw the first increase in death rates by 2% in 2009. Id.
40. Id. at 28.
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Whether a prisoner receives direct, hands-on care, or care over the
airwaves, a major deficit in analyzing and understanding prisoner health
issues is the uncoordinated methodologies for obtaining and reporting data
at many levels.41 Nonetheless, the legal benchmarks by which that care is
consented to and delivered are complex but readily available and digestible
for the private provider.42
III. CONSENT FOR HOSPITALIZED PRISONER-PATIENTS
AND THE PRISON’S INTERESTS
A. Medical Consent to Treat
It is well-settled law that prisoners maintain constitutional protections
while incarcerated.43 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court declared
“[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the
protections of the Constitution.”44 It is also well-settled that such
constitutional rights for prisoners are not absolute, and that great deference
should be given to state actors in making and implementing policies that are
aimed at maintaining the safety and security of the institution.45 Finding the
balance between a prisoner’s constitutional rights while incarcerated and a
state actor’s policy determinations can be a challenge, especially in the
context of providing health care to prisoners.46
In the watershed case Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court
determined that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that

41. Schaenman et al., supra note 15, at 28.
42. See Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
43. Id.
44. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
45. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“We must accord substantial
deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant
responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the
most appropriate means to accomplish them.”); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 349 (1987) (“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have
determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a
‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights.”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Where a state penal system is
involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in Martinez, additional reason to accord deference
to the appropriate prison authorities.”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1973) (“where
state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the
appropriate prison authorities.”).
46. Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that if prison officials,
including doctors, identify situations in which they reasonably believe that treatment is required,
notwithstanding the prisoner’s asserted right to refuse it, the right must give way).
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prisoners are entitled to adequate health care while incarcerated.47 The
Court concluded that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners” meets the level of cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment.48 A prisoner, by definition, is not free to seek
treatment for serious medical conditions that may be life-threatening or
extremely painful.49 Allowing a prisoner to suffer with a treatable medical
condition that the prisoner cannot address on his own due to confinement
imposed by the state could result in liability for the state under the Eighth
Amendment.50
The standard for determining “deliberate indifference,” and thus the
fundamental constraints on state-provided health care in prison, was
established in Farmer v. Brennan.51 There, the Supreme Court held that in
order for an official to be found liable for cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment for denying health care, the health care
official must both be aware of an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or
safety and must disregard such risk.52 “The Eighth Amendment does not
outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual
‘punishments.’ ”53 The showing of deliberate indifference must be
subjective and based on the intent of the actor.54
While a prisoner’s right to receive health care is embedded within the
United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment,55 a prisoner’s right to
consent to or refuse such health care is mostly embedded in the commonlaw right to informed consent and an individual’s constitutional right to
privacy.56 Generally, courts have permitted prisoners to exercise this right
47. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (holding that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”).
48. Id. at 104.
49. ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners, 102–03 (3d ed. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/treat
ment_of_prisoners_commentary_website.pdf.
50. Brittany Bondurant, The Privatization of Prisons and Prisoner Healthcare: Addressing
the Extent of Prisoners’ Right to Healthcare, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
407, 408–09 (2013). See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1988) (holding that there was
state action where a private physician had contracted with the state to provide medical care for
prisoners).
51. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (stating that the official must be aware of facts from which he or she could infer a
substantial risk of serious harm, and he or she must also draw the inference).
55. Id. at 832.
56. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (“After Quinlan, however,
most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common-law right to
informed consent or on both the common-law right and a constitutional privacy right.”).
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to consent to treatment or refuse to receive treatment in the same way any
patient outside of the prison system would be permitted to do so.57 The
exception to such standard is when the state’s interest outweighs the liberty
interest of the patient in making his or her medical decisions.58 As stated
above, prisoners continue to enjoy the protections of the Constitution even
while incarcerated, but the Court has determined that many of the
protections afforded to other citizens do not extend, in full, to prisoners.59
As the Court in Washington v. Harper stated, “the extent of a prisoner’s
right under the [Constitution] to avoid the unwanted [treatment] must be
defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement.”60
The Supreme Court set the standard in Turner by which a court should
determine whether a state action unconstitutionally impinges on an inmate’s
constitutional right, such as a prisoner’s right to privacy in making his or
her own health care decision that may conflict with the prison’s interest.61
The standard is whether the action is “reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.”62 The Court articulated the standard largely on the
principle of separation of powers by noting, “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day
judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.”63
The Court further noted that “[T]he rule would also distort the decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the
57. See, e.g., id. at 278 (“Just this Term, in the course of holding that a State’s procedures for
administering antipsychotic medication to prisoners were sufficient to satisfy due process
concerns, we recognized that prisoners possess ‘a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’ ”) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990)); Harper, 494 U.S.
at 229 (“The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a
substantial interference with that person’s liberty”); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 250 (2d Cir.
2006);White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (“A prisoner’s right to refuse
treatment is useless without knowledge of the proposed treatment. Prisoners have a right to such
information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed
treatment, as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made
available in a prison setting.”); Leaphart v. Prison Health Servs., No. 3:10-CV-1019, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 135435 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 21, 2010) (holding that convicted prisoners retain a limited
right to refuse treatment and a related right to be informed of the proposed treatment and viable
alternatives).
58. See Prisons and Prisoners’ Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (stating that the
rational basis test is used to review prison regulations).
59. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (noting that freedom of association is
curtailed in the prison context).
60. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
61. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 89 (1987).
62. Id. at 89.
63. Id.
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possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less
restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.”64
The Court in Turner set forth four factors that should be taken into
consideration when determining whether a state action by prisons meets the
rational basis test: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection”
between the state action and a legitimate government interest, (2) whether
alternative means exist for those impacted to exercise the asserted
constitutional right, (3) whether and to what extent accommodating the
asserted right will impact prison staff, the inmates’ liberty, and the
distribution of resources, and (4) whether alternatives exist that are less
restrictive and still achieve the asserted interests of the state.65
Great deference is afforded to prison officials in determining what is
necessary for the security and safety of the prison and the other prisoners,66
and “it is the rare case in which a court finds that the State’s intrusion into
the constitutional rights of a presumptively innocent criminal defendant
warrants a judicial intrusion into ‘the determinations of those charged with
the formidable task of running a prison.’ ”67
The Supreme Court elaborated upon its decision in Turner when
holding, in Harper, that a prison official’s ability to override a patient’s
health care decision-making stands even if the patient is incompetent.68 In
applying the standard articulated in Turner, the Supreme Court concluded
that a prison’s action to medicate an incompetent, violent prisoner who
represents a danger to prison officials and others within the prison walls
was “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,”69 and that
such a rational basis standard should be applied even if the constitutional
right being infringed is fundamental.70 The fact that the prisoner was
incompetent did not change the Court’s analysis.71 Courts applying Turner
have concluded that there are many other scenarios in which the state’s
interest is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, thus
validating infringement on a prisoner’s constitutional right to privacy and,
by extension, a prisoner’s right to consent to or refuse medical treatment the

64. Id.
65. Id. at 89–91.
66. Id. at 85.
67. Jason Feldman, Piercing the Veil of Dangerousness in Forcible Medication: Why Pretrial
Detainees Are Due More Process Than Washington v. Harper, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 467, 491
(2013) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)).
68. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222–23 (1990).
69. Id. at 225–26.
70. Id.at 223.
71. Id. at 222.
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prison officials believe is in the prison’s best interest.72 For example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1979 held that a prisoner could
be forced to undergo dialysis because the prisoner’s refusal to undergo
dialysis was not related to his wish to die, but rather was an act of protest in
an attempt to secure a transfer to a minimum security prison.73 The court
determined that it would be too disruptive to the prison system to have
patients refuse medical treatment in an attempt to manipulate prison
officials and held that that state’s interest in maintaining the order of the
prison overrode the prisoner’s constitutional right of privacy and choice of
health care.74
The District Court for the Southern District of New York reached the
same conclusion in Zaire v. Dalsheim, where a prisoner was required to
receive the diphtheria-tetanus vaccine or face solitary confinement.75 The
court concluded that the state’s interest in “preventing the spread of deadly
diseases among a closely quartered prison population”76 overrode any
interest an individual prisoner may have in refusing the inoculation, since it
was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective.77
B. Constitutional Rights of Incompetent or Incapacitated Prisoners
It appears relatively settled law that a competent prisoner has the right
to consent to or refuse to receive medical treatment, and that a prison
official may either override such a decision or force treatment on the
prisoner provided there is a legitimate penological interest being served.78
However, the jurisprudence fails to address who stands in the shoes of the
patient in making medical decisions when the patient is incapacitated or
incompetent and there is no legitimate danger or fear with which the prison

72. Comm’n of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1979); Zaire v. Dalsheim, 698 F.
Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 904 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990).
73. Myers, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
74. Id.
75. Zaire, 698 F. Supp. at 58, 60–61.
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id.
78. Prisons and Prisoner’s Rights: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION
INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). See also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (stating that “when a prisoner regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests”).
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officials are concerned.79 The answer to such question often lies within
individual state statutes.80
Almost all states have a mechanism that permits individuals to
designate a health care agent who is responsible for making medical
decisions for the individual in the event the individual becomes
incapacitated or incompetent.81 States also promulgate laws that establish a
“default” hierarchy of decision-makers in the event the patient has not
properly identified who he or she wants to be the decision maker.82 Most
states do not directly address the issue of the prisoner-patient. Absent
statutory instructions to the contrary, hospitals should rely upon the state
sanctioned hierarchy of decision makers when faced with a prisoner who is
incapacitated or incompetent.83
While one could argue that prisoners are wards of the state, and
therefore, it is the state that should make health care decisions on behalf of
the incapacitated or incompetent patient, the interest of the patient rarely
aligns with the interest of the prison.84 Absent a legitimate state interest to
the contrary, prison officials should be removed from the medical decisionmaking process, as the patient’s surrogate would likely best represent the
patient’s interests.85 To select a surrogate, the typical statutory hierarchy
should be followed, as the hierarchy reflects those in the best position to
carry out the patient’s wishes.86
The State of Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services (“DPSCS”) developed a policy that directly addresses medical
decision making for incompetent inmates and has implemented a process

79. See generally Women’s Health & Education Center, End of Life Decision Making,
http://www.womenshealthsection.com/content/print.php3?title=heal022&cat=5&lng=english (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015).
80. Id. See also ABA, Default Surrogate Consent Statutes (June 2014),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_default_surrogate_consen
t_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf (providing an overview of state default surrogate consent statutes in
the absence of an appointed agent or guardian with health powers).
81. Id.
82. ABA,
Standards
for
Criminal
Justice:
Treatment
of
Prisoners,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_tre
atmentprisoners.html#23-1.1 (2011).
83. Id.
84. See M. Scott Smith et al., Healthcare Decision-Making for Mentally Incapacitated
Incarcerated Individuals, 22 ELDER L.J. 175, 197–98 (2014).
85. Id. at 198 (noting that the patient’s surrogate is often in the best position to make the
decisions in the patient’s best interests).
86. Id. See also ABA, Standards on Treatment of Prisoners, § 23-6.14,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_tre
atmentprisoners.html#23-6.14.
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requiring judicial review.87 Policy #124-403 states: “it is the policy of
DPSCS to allow inmates to accept or refuse medical/mental health
treatment up to the degree of their competency.”88 Further, “[f]or
individuals determined to be incompetent, however, guardianship in some
form may have to be secured.”89 The policy proscribes that once evaluated
and deemed incompetent by a psychiatrist assigned by the private medical
provider contracted to provide services at the institution where the inmate is
housed, guardianship should be pursued for the inmate.90
In Maryland, guardianship proceedings require a conclusion from a
court of competent jurisdiction that there is
clear and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning his person, including provisions for health
care . . . because of any mental disability [or] disease . . . and that
no less restrictive form of intervention is available which is
consistent with the person’s welfare and safety.91
The guardianship proceeding inherently involves appointing an
independent third party who is most likely to adhere to the standard of
substituted judgment, and choose the course of action most similar to the
patient had the patient not been incapacitated.92 Interestingly, for the
Maryland general population, the law does not require a psychiatrist or
psychologist to determine incapacity, but only requires two licensed
physicians.93 The Maryland DPSCS has clearly prescribed an added layer
of protection for the potentially incapacitated prisoner needing health
care.94 A surrogate structure such as this could serve as a model policy in
most jurisdictions to ensure the prisoner-patient’s best interest is
represented in complicated medical decision-making scenarios. While such

87. STATE OF MD. DEP’T. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., Petition for Guardianship,
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicservs/procurement/ihs/directives/DOC/124_403.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-705(b) (LexisNexis 2014).
92. Id.
93. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (“Prior to providing,
withholding, or withdrawing treatment for which authorization has been obtained or will be
sought under this subtitle, the attending physician and a second physician, one of whom shall have
examined the patient within 2 hours before making the certification, shall certify in writing that
the patient is incapable of making an informed decision regarding the treatment.”).
94. MD. PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., Petition for Guardianship, DPSCSD 124-403,
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/ publicservs/procurement/ihs/directives/DOC/124_403.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
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a policy is likely in the patient’s best interest,95 absent clear legal guidance
or local policy, the liability risks hospitals face in permitting such surrogate
decision making remain unclear.
C. Prisoners and Organ Donation
Issues abound when considering prisoner organ donation.96 These
range from the ethical concerns about whether a prisoner should receive
valuable organ resources over the general population to whether death row
inmates should be allowed to donate their organs upon successful
executions.97 The opinions are both varied and persuasive depending on
your core ethical and medico-legal beliefs.98 This paper does not explore
the heated ethical debates regarding prisoners and organ transplant. Instead,
it focuses on providing guidance on the operational aspects of prisoner
organ donation for private hospitals.
The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (“OTPN”) was
established by Congress thirty years ago to proscribe the selling of organs,
and to coordinate and control this scarce resource allocation.99 OPTN has
established clear policies with regard to every facet of the organ donation
process.100 However, Organ Procurement Organizations (“OPO”) are free
to set their own criteria for accepting organs and the prisoner population
may be excluded from consideration under these policies.101 The OPTN
policies establish the responsibility for determining organ compatibility and

95. End of Life Decision Making, WOMEN’S HEALTH & EDUCATION CTR.,
http://www.womenshealthsection.com/content/print.php3?title=heal022&cat=5&lng=english (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
96. See, e.g., Should Prisoners be Allowed to Donate their Organs?, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 2013/04/25/should-prisoners-be-allowed-to-donate-theirorgans (last updated Apr. 26, 2013).
97. Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until it Hurts: Prisoners are not the Answer to the National
Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 596–97, 601–02 (2002); Kate Douglas, Prison Inmates are
Constitutionally Entitled to Organ Transplants – So Now What?, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 561–
62 (2005); Arkalgud Sampath Kumar, Prisoners on Death Row, 95 ANN THORAC 770, 770
(2013),
http://www.annalsthoracicsurgery.org/issue/S0003-4975%2812%29X0013-4?page=1;
M.A. Millis & M. Simmerling; Prisoners as Organ Donors: Is it Worth the Effort? Is it Ethical?,
41 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1, 23–24 (2009); OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm., The Ethics of Organ
Donation from Condemned Prisoners, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethicsof-organ-donation-from-condemned-prisoners/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
98. See Hinkle, supra note 97; see also Kumar, supra note 97.
99. NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT OF 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006); Blood Vessels
Recovered with Organs and Intended for use in Organ Transplantation, 71 Fed. Reg. 27649
(proposed May 12, 2006) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).
100. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Policies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments
/OPTN_Policies.pdf [hereinafter OPTN Policies].
101. Id.
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candidacy on OPO.102 However, what is clear from the point of view of the
Ethics Committee of the OPTN/United Organ Sharing Network (“UNOS”)
is that prisoners should not be excluded from lists of those seeking organs
simply because they are incarcerated.103 Specifically, “[t]he UNOS Ethics
Committee opines that absent any societal imperative, one’s status as a
prisoner should not preclude them from consideration for a transplant; such
consideration does not guarantee transplantation.”104
Essentially, a prisoner is ethically entitled to receive a transplanted
organ like anyone else on a transplant list and will be required to meet the
strict criteria established to be a successful candidate.105 Once the medical
provider for the correctional facility has identified a prisoner as needing an
organ transplant, the prisoner would be referred to a transplant center for
medical work up and a determination of candidacy.106 The transplant center
then would follow its own specific policies regarding prisoner
categorization and candidacy.107
There is some recent evidence that facilitating prisoners’ access to
organ transplants would actually reduce penological costs.108 In a study
conducted evaluating 104 incarcerated end-stage renal disease (“ESRD”)
patients, nine patients with a history of Hepatitis C were transplanted faster
with Hepatitis C kidneys than other prisoners waiting for non-infectious
organs (6.6 months versus 49.6 months).109 Study investigators concluded
that overall costs for managing post-transplant patients were substantially
lower than costs for continuing dialysis for those still waiting for
kidneys.110

102. Id.
103. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Convicted Criminals and Transplant
Evaluation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/convicted-criminals-and-transplant-evaluation/.
104. Id.
105. See OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned
Prisoners, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited Oct. 1, 2015),
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/the-ethics-of-organ-donation-from-condemnedprisoners/ (stating, however, that the “OPTN/UNOS Ethics committee opposes any strategy or
proposed statute regarding organ donation from condemned prisoners until all of the potential
ethical concerns have been satisfactorily addressed.”); see also United Network for Organ
Sharing, What Every Patient Needs to Know (last visited Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf (explaining the purpose of the United Network for
Organ Sharing and its mission of availability for all types of patients).
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. See Mandip Panesar et al., Evaluation of a Renal Transplant Program for Incarcerated
ESRD Patients, 20 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 220, 226 (2014) (addressing the significant
benefits of allowing prisoners’ access to transplants as opposed to dialysis).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Private transplant centers engage in debates that focus more on their
business model and institutional guidelines rather than constitutional or
ethical concerns.111 These centers are pressed to discern available organs in
constant demand,112 and to pass national certification muster with regard to
survival rates, among other criteria.113 Prisoners who come to the hospital
with a higher morbidity rate than the general population are not routinely
considered the best candidates to either donate or to receive organs.
Succinctly, in the absence of federal guiding documents or laws on
prisoner organ donation, such policies and procedures are established state
by state.114 As an example, Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services articulates the necessary procedures for those
prisoners seeking transplantation, either to receive or donate.115 In
Maryland, prisoners may donate organs to a family member in state, but the
policy does not allow them to receive a solid organ.116 The donation
process is overseen by the prison system’s regional medical director, but is
clinically managed by the transplant center.117 The recipient bears the cost
of the transplant.118
For prisoner-patients who are incapacitated and are admitted to private
hospitals with a fatal prognosis, the question may arise as to whom would
consent for an organ donation.119 As discussed above, the consent process
would typically follow the state statutes and regulations for surrogate
decision making.120 The correctional facility could release the prisonerpatient from incarceration as their continued custody requirement cannot be
accomplished for punishment or rehabilitation owing to their fatal
condition. At that point, the prisoner-patient simply would become like any
111. Hinkle, supra note 98.
112. Id. at 593–94.
113. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADVISORY COMM. ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION (2011) (noting regulations that encourage an increased rate of organ
transplants from all types of donors and stringent transplant requirements in order to meet
certification standards).
114. Prisoner Organ Transplants, Donations Create Controversy, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr.
15,
2014),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/apr/15/prisoner-organ-transplantsdonations-create-controversy/ (highlighting numerous states and their various approaches
regarding prisoner organ donation).
115. MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR. SERV. OFFICE OF CLINICAL SERV. AND INMATE
HEALTH, ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL, CH. 12, ORGAN DONORS AND TRANSPLANTS.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at 2–3.
118. Id.
119. The Ethics of Organ Donation from Condemned Prisoners, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. – HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/theethics-of-organ-donation-from-condemned-prisoners/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
120. Lisa V. Brock & Anna Mastroianni, Clinical Ethics and Law, UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF
MED. (Jan. 22, 2013), https://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/topics/law.html#Surrogate.
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other patient in the general population, and corresponding policies would
apply.
IV. PRIVATE HOSPITAL LIABILITY
In the context of receiving health care, prisoners may seek relief for
alleged damages through various avenues against both the state and private
actors.121 They may pursue an action based on Constitutional or federal
statutory grounds, potentially reaching the state through the Fourteenth
Amendment.122 They may also seek relief against individual physicians by
filing malpractice claims based on state guidelines.123 For private hospitals,
as articulated below, liability exposure exists, but a successful claim is
generally atypical.124 Notably, a successful constitutionally based claim
may have a greater impact on a larger number of people as a result of
changes to the law affecting all prisoners.125 Private claims based on
medical malpractice, while potentially financially rewarding for the
individual, would have an insignificant impact, if any, on changing
precedent.126
A. Constitutional and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
The Constitution proscribes violations of prisoners’ rights by the
federal government through various amendments including, but not limited
to, the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” proscription,
and by the state government through the Fourteenth Amendment.127 The
general statutory remedy for prisoners who allege violations while in
custody is established in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.128 In order for a claim to

121. Civil Liability for Inadequate Prisoner Medical Care, AELE MONTHLY L.J. 301, 302–03,
307 (2007), http://www.aele.org/law/2007JBSEP/2007-09MLJ301.pdf.
122. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990).
123. Civil Liability for Inadequate Prisoner Medical Care, AELE MONTHLY L.J. 301, 302–03,
307 (2007), http://www.aele.org/law/2007JBSEP/2007-09MLJ301.pdf.
124. Id. at 301–03.
125. Id. at 301–02.
126. Id. at 301–10 (noting various cases that demonstrate the difficulty in convincing a court of
both the severity of the situation and intentional disregard for the prisoner’s health).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, and citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
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successfully move forward pursuant to the constitutional and statutory
framework, the injured party must show that the defendant is a state actor,
or that they have committed acts under color of state law.129 The Supreme
Court held firm to prior decisions stating that “state action” remedies and
those “under color of state law” in essence are one and the same in general,
though the merits giving rise to, and support of, a justiciable claim may
vary from case to case.130 Either the state acts by abridging rights, or a
private person acts under the ambit of state authority who then becomes
potentially liable.131 The question that remains is whether a private hospital
becomes a state actor based solely on the fact that it treats prisoners within
its facility.
The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., articulated a
two part approach to identify when conduct would be “fairly attributable” to
the state:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is
responsible . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Without a limit such as this, private parties could face
constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state
rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding
them.132
Clearly, the Court intended to limit private parties from being exposed
to liability on state action grounds except where there is a clear nexus
between the state and the private person.133 Because the facts of each case
may be distinct with regard to when a private party acts under color of state
law, the Court has articulated over the years several tests to ascertain the

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .”).
129. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982). The complainant filed a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging due process violations by defendant when his property was attached
pursuant to state law, thereby making a § 1983 remedy available. Id. at 925. The Court in Lugar
explained the distinctions between a Fourteenth Amendment claim asserting “state action” versus
a § 1983 claim asserting that a private individual acted under “color of state law.” Id. at 934.
130. Id. at 935 ( “If the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes state action as delimited
by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support
a suit under § 1983.”).
131. Id. at 935–37.
132. Id. at 937 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
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connection between the private party and the state.134 Discerning the nexus
that gives rise to liability then becomes heavily fact-based.135
Are private hospitals and providers state actors? As described below,
the courts have not been clear as to whether liability attaches, and that
determination is fact-dependent. As far back as 1968, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial
Hospital Commission, held that the defendant physicians sitting on a county
appointed commission were liable under color of state law.136 The court
stated:
Defendant commission members were appointed by the
governing body of Allen County to operate the hospital.
Moreover, the hospital is the only one in the area and was
financed in part by public funds. An institution such as this,
serving an important public function and financed by public
funds, is sufficiently linked with the state for its acts to be subject
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the
members of the commission hold office as a result of
governmental appointment and because they administer a public
facility, their actions must be regarded as having been taken
under color of law. Hence, the provisions of § 1983 and
§ 1985(3) are applicable to them.137
Simply put, the physicians sitting as commissioners with approval
power over other physicians’ employment were so connected by way of
appointment, funding, and function that they were acting on behalf of the
municipality, thereby making them liable under color of state law.138 They

134. Id. at 939 (noting Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S 461, 469–70 (the “public function” test);
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170–71 (the “state compulsion” test); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (the “nexus” test); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 164 (the “joint action” test)).
135. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (involving a
claim of racial discrimination by a coffee shop in a building owned by Parking Authority in which
the court stated, “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance”); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (involving plaintiff’s allegation of state action
when private company cut off power without due process, the Court stated in dicta, “[t]he mere
fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the
State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citation omitted).
136. 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968).
137. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (“[I]f two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws . . . whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators.”).
138. Meredith, 397 F.2d at 35.
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were not state officials per se, but they acted as such, conspiring with state
officials to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. 139
Likewise, in O’Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hospital, the
Sixth Circuit also found a sufficient nexus between the defendant hospital’s
Board of Directors and the state to overturn the District Court’s dismissal
below.140 Unlike Meredith, the Board of Directors for Grayson County War
Memorial Hospital was not appointed by the state.141 The O’Neill court
found a nexus on other grounds because of other connections the hospital
had with the state, including lease arrangements and hospital revenue
through statutory-based allocation of funds.142 Interestingly, the O’Neill
court did not clearly define the test upon which it relied to determine the
nexus between private and state action.143 Judicial history is replete with
attempts at creating a nexus test without uniformity or universal adoption.
Closer to the point of private actors and prisoners, the Supreme Court
in West v. Adkins explored a case involving a North Carolina inmate.144
After tearing his Achilles tendon, he was assessed and treated by a
contractual orthopedic physician.145 The prisoner brought the § 1983 claim
pro se, alleging the physician failed to adequately treat (or make a referral
for) his condition through surgery.146 The District Court found that the
physician was acting under color of state law, and was therefore liable for
damages caused by the treatment delay.147 After the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision, an en banc
panel reheard the case and ultimately affirmed the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment.148 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.149
According to the Supreme Court, the split Court of Appeals erroneously

139. Id. at 35–36.
140. O’Neill v. Grayson Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1142 (6th Cir. 1973)
(physician plaintiff claimed his due process and equal protection rights were violated by the
Board’s refusal to allow him to admit patients to the hospital).
141. Id. at 1143.
142. Id. at 1142–43.
143. Id. The O’Neill Court stated, “We do not suggest that the presence of state action in this
case or in any case can be determined by the application of some clear-cut test. Id. at 1143. See
also id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“[T]o fashion
and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection
Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court has never attempted’ . . . . Only by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance.”) (citation omitted).
144. West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 44 (1988).
145. Id. at 43–44.
146. Id. at 44–45.
147. Id. at 45–46.
148. Id. at 46.
149. Id. at 57–58.
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applied a prior Supreme Court decision involving an accused public
defender who was found not to be acting under color of state law, and
therefore not liable in a § 1983 claim.150
In West, the respondent physician was employed under contract in
order to render required medical services to inmates.151 Because his duties
were aligned with the state’s objectives, the Court held that the physician
was acting under color of state law.152 The nexus was as close as it could
get.153 The state prison system had a duty to render appropriate medical
care,154 and the contract physician likewise had the same affirmative
duty;155 they were inextricably intertwined as actors with the same purpose
of treating the prisoner-patient.156
The Court also expressed concern that if private physicians under
contract with the state are to provide medical care, they could escape
liability under the pretense that they were not state actors.157 Thus the state
would be able to absolve itself of its constitutional duty to provide adequate
medical treatment by contracting such services to a private third party.158
With finality, the Court held that a successful petitioner must demonstrate
two things. The first element required a showing that the petitioner was
deprived a right afforded by the Constitution, or a United States law.159 The
second element required a showing that the offender was acting under color
of law.160 In this case, the physician’s action satisfied both elements.161
At the same time, there are a host of cases where courts found no state
action against a private hospital.162 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
150. West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1988). In Polk County v. Dodson, the Court held that
a public defender acting in his professional capacity was doing so in controversion of the state’s
goals in prosecuting the inmate, and therefore, was not acting under color of state law. 454 U.S.
312, 325 (1981) (opposing purposes widens the gap when determining whether or not a private
actor is operating under color of state law).
151. West, 487 U.S. at 45.
152. Id. at 54–55 (stating “[i]t is only those physicians authorized by the State to whom the
inmate may turn. Under state law, the only medical care West could receive for his injury was that
provided by the State”).
153. See id. at 55 (stating that North Carolina employs physicians and defers to their
professional judgment in providing medical care to its prison inmates).
154. Id. at 56.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. West, 487 U.S. at 55–56.
158. Id. at 56 n.14 (quoting West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1987)).
159. Id. at 48.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 48, 54.
162. See, e.g., Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 895–96 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
“for a state involvement with a private entity to confer jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the
involvement must be with the specific activity of which a party complains”) (citation omitted);
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Circuit held that simply because a hospital receives federal funds, the
decision not to renew a provider’s privileges does not rise to the level of
state action.163 In Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, a Catholic Church
affiliated hospital refused a provider’s renewal of privileges because he
performed sterilizations and abortions against hospital bylaws.164 The
district court held there was no state action, and therefore, no relief under
§ 1983; however, they did find that the hospital was in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 300a-7.165 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
“concluding that the receipt of federal funds alone does not transform an
otherwise private activity into a state action.”166
That same month, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tackled a
similar issue in Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital.167 In Taylor, the hospital
received state tax exemptions and Hill-Burton Funds168 and denied the
petitioner’s request for a tubal ligation following her Caesarian section.169
After the hospital refused her procedure, the patient subsequently joined a
class that claimed, inter alia, that the hospital acted under color of state law
to deny them the procedure and relief was therefore available pursuant to §
1983.170 The petitioner argued that her case was distinct from Chrisman
and previous cases because the hospital had a monopoly in Billings,
Montana, and there was no other place the petitioner could have gone for
her sterilization procedure.171 The question, then, was whether the

Tomarkin v. Ward, 534 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that a former state prisoner
could not recover against a hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the hospital was deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of the prisoner); Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d. 861, 863 (S.D. N.Y
1984) (finding that the professional actions of a private physician does not establish that the
physician “act under the color of state law when providing medical services to an inmate”)
(citation omitted).
163. Id. at 896.
164. Id. at 895.
165. Id. at 895–96. In Watkins, the hospital received Hill-Burton Funds. Id. at 896.
166. Watkins v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 520 F.2d 894, 896 (1975) (quoting Ascherman v.
Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Med. Ctr., 507 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974)) (“The mere receipt
of Hill-Burton funds . . . is not sufficient [sic] connection between the state and the private activity
of which appellant complains to make out state action.”).
167. 523 F.2d 75 (D. Mont. 1975).
168. Id. at 75–76.
169. Id. at 76.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 77 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 360 (1974))
(“[P]rivate conduct may not be regarded as that of the state unless the state is involved in the
specific activity complained of, and that the monopoly status of a private . . . company did not in
itself or in combination with state regulation and the fact that an essential public service was
involved, constitute ‘state action.’ ”) (emphasis added).
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monopoly status of the private hospital alone or combined with government
funding established state action.172
However, seven years later, the Taylor court quoted the Supreme
Court in Jackson when it stated in dicta that “there is ‘insufficient
relationship between the challenged actions of the entity involved and their
monopoly status.’ ”173 Ultimately, the court upheld the lower court’s ruling
that no state action existed, and therefore, no relief could be granted for a
§ 1983 claim.174 A monopoly simply is not enough to find that a private
hospital was a state actor, or operated under color of state law.175
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in West to hold that a private
hospital that provided emergency care to a prisoner could not be considered
a state actor.176 In Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, the court
concluded that while the Supreme Court emphasized in West that the
contractual relationship between the state and the provider was not
dispositive of the state actor analysis,177 it comes into play when:
[D]etermining whether a private health care provider has entered
into its relationship with the state and the prisoner on a voluntary
basis . . . private organizations and their employees that have
only an incidental and transitory relationship with the state’s
penal system usually cannot be said to have accepted, voluntarily,
the responsibility of acting for the state and assuming the state’s
responsibility for incarcerated persons.178
While the conclusion in Rodriguez that the private hospital was not a
state actor was based largely on its obligation under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”) to treat any and all patients
who needed emergency services regardless of their custodial status,179 the
holding could be applied in the context of any private hospital providing
basic medical care to a prisoner while under no specific contract with the
state to provide such care.180 This analysis would be particularly true where
172. Id. at 77 (discussing whether the monopoly status of a hospital or receipt of government
funds, among other things, suggests state action). Interestingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, as discussed earlier in the section, relied on the monopoly of the hospital to infer
state action. Meredith v. Allen Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp. Comm’n, 387 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1968).
173. Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009).
177. Id.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 827–28.
180. See id. at 828 (stating that the fact that a hospital has to provide emergency medical care
to prisoners does not mean that it assumed the penological mission of the state).
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a private hospital and its providers would be exercising independent
professional judgment and not carrying out some state objective.181
Any analysis of whether a private hospital would be considered a state
actor for purposes of liability under a § 1983 claim is fact-intensive.182
Recent case law indicates that it is unlikely a private hospital with no
existing formal relationship with a prison would be considered a state
actor.183 Private hospitals do not discriminate against the types of patients
seen in its facility, and they are required to exercise independent
professional medical judgment regardless of the status of the patient.184
Private facilities may choose to contract with prison systems to render
medical care on an as-needed basis.185 However, case law supports the
conclusion that a private hospital incidentally assisting the state by treating
prisoner-patients on an ad hoc basis would not qualify the hospital as
voluntarily assuming the responsibility of the state.186
Tangential to the prisoner analysis, but of great import, private
hospitals now developing programs at the behest of the federal or state
government may find they operate under color of state law, and therefore,
may be exposed to liability under a § 1983 claim.187 The analysis may turn
on whether the hospital or facility goes beyond activities conducted in the
regular course of its business at the state’s behest.188 Liability may arise as
the hospital acts less like an independent medical entity and more like a
service provider working on behalf of the state. At the very least, the
question may be reasonably put forth for this activity, or any similar activity

181. Id.
182. See Carmack v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 465 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 (D. Mass. 2006)
(describing the analysis of a § 1983 claim in the case of a former train conductor alleging that the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority was a state actor: “[t]he inquiry, under any of these
theories, is necessarily fact-intensive, and the ultimate conclusion regarding state action must be
based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case”).
183. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009)
(distinguishing hospitals that treat inmates in an emergency situation from those that contract with
prison systems for voluntary care and concluding that the former action is not sufficient to make
the hospital a state actor).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 827.
186. See id. (observing that private facilities that only have “incidental and transitory”
interactions with the penal system have not assumed the state’s responsibility).
187. See J ARED P. C OLE ET AL ., C ONG . R ESEARCH S ERV ., R43829, E BOLA : S ELECTED
L EGAL I SSUES (2014) (discussing programs for Ebola management, such as the required use
of personal protective equipment for hospital workers, that would be mandated under the
authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
188. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting
that a § 1983 claim in the healthcare setting must weigh the extent to which the doctor’s actions
were controlled or influenced by the state).
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where the government intervenes for the purpose of public safety by
utilizing private resources.189
B. Vicarious Liability
Ironically, even if it was determined that a private hospital was
standing in the shoes of the state when providing medical care to a prisoner,
the Supreme Court has explicitly held that vicarious liability cannot be
imposed on a municipality under § 1983, as Congress did not intend § 1983
to create liability on states solely because it employs a tortfeasor.190
Liability for the state under § 1983 exists only if the municipality itself has
employed a policy of some nature that caused the constitutional tort.191 A
private hospital pursuing a claim against the state may be frustrated, as
would a patient seeking to enjoin the state based in tort by a private
hospital.192
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held:
Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under section
1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers. On
the other hand . . . Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot
be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.193
The Monell court conducted an exhaustive review of the legislative
intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 before overruling its prior holding
that municipalities have complete immunity under § 1983.194 Instead, the

189. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (noting that the language of
§ 1983 imposes liability on local governments for constitutional deprivations through informal
“custom,” such as activity where the government intervenes).
190. See id. In Monell, employees filed a § 1983 class action against the Board of Education
and the City of New York, and individual officials, on an allegation that they were compelled to
take unpaid leaves of absence (“LOA”) while pregnant for medical reasons though the LOAs at
the time were not indicated. Id. at 660–61.
191. See id. at 691 (finding that a policy, either formally adopted or even custom of a
government actor, creates § 1983 liability).
192. Id. at 690–91.
193. Id. at 659 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168 (1961)).
194. Id. at 667–91.
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Court held in Monell that municipalities could be sued, but not held
vicariously liable.195
While the Monell court chose not to explore whether a private
corporate employer may be exposed on a respondeat superior theory, other
courts have held that a corporate employer may not face such exposure
because of the torts of its employees.196 At least one court concluded that
this general principle would undoubtedly apply in the context where a
prisoner sued a private hospital in a § 1983 claim.197 In McIlwain v. Prince
William Hospital, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
granted a hospital’s motion for summary judgment related to a prisoner’s
claim that the hospital failed to inform him of a medical condition.198 The
hospital emergency provider obtained an HIV test without the prisoner’s
consent, the test came back positive, and a second provider for the
correctional facility never informed the prisoner after the hospital physician
had relayed the information.199 The prisoner alleged constitutional
violations for failure to notify him of his positive test, thus depriving him of
an opportunity to obtain treatment and resulting in personal harm and harm
to his wife when he continued sexual relations.200 On the issue of the
hospital, the court granted the motion for summary judgment, but allowed
the contractual physician case to proceed due to disputed facts.201 The court
noted that, unless a private hospital has a policy that violates § 1983 on a
corporate level, the hospital could not be held liable for any of the acts of its
employees or providers even if it is deemed a state actor for § 1983

195. See id. at 691 (concluding that the language of the statute supports that interpretation
because it allows person B to become liable for A’s tort only if B “caused” A to subject the third
party to the tort; a simple employee/employer relationship is not enough to create liability); see
also Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding a private store
not vicariously liable under § 1983 for acts of its employees); see Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co.,
678 F.2d 504, 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that an individual who was beaten by a
security guard could not recover from the guard’s employer); see Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc.,
504 F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding a department store not liable for actions of an off duty
police officer); see Estate of Iodice v. Gimbels, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(finding a department store not liable for false arrest by a security guard).
196. See McIlwain v. Prince William Hosp., 774 F. Supp. 986, 992 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(dismissing claims against the hospital because no policy or custom led to the failure to tell the
plaintiff about HIV test results, but allowing the claim against the doctor who possibly knew about
the test results to proceed).
197. Id. at 992.
198. Id. at 987.
199. Id. at 988.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 992.
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purposes.202 Such a conclusion further reduces the potential liability on a
private hospital in the context of treating prisoners.203
Of special note, however, the McIlwain court pointed out when the
state might fall prey to a § 1983 claim based on the actions of a private
hospital.204 In citing Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hospital, the
McIlwain court referenced in dicta: “[A] state becomes responsible for the
acts of a private party such as a hospital if the party “acts (1) in an
exclusively state capacity, (2) for the state’s direct benefit, or (3) at the
state’s specific behest.”205
The implication of McIlwain, then, is that if the state charges a private
hospital with performing certain activities at the state’s request, § 1983
liability may attach.206 In essence, a nexus created by contract, exclusivity,
or operationalizing a state-mandated or collaborated program may open the
door to a claim against the state based on private action.
C. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In 1996, Congress effectively enacted a roadblock of sorts for
prisoners wishing to file malpractice claims (or any civil claim for that
matter) in federal court in the form of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”).207 PLRA was created in response to the volume of cases being
brought by prisoners that effectively clogged the court system.208 The
PLRA applies to civil actions brought by prisoners including those
offenders housed in the military centers, juvenile facilities, drug treatment

202. McIlwain, 774 F. Supp. at 990.
203. Id. at 989.
204. Id. In Modaber, a physician claimed he was denied due process under the 14th
Amendment by the hospital by revoking his staff privileges. Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023, 1024 (4th Cir. 1982). The district court dismissed for failure to state a
claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. Congruent with well-established precedent, the mere
receipt of Hill-Burton federal funds was insufficient for a private hospital to be deemed a state
actor. Id. at 1026–27.
205. McIlwain, 774 F. Supp. at 989 (quoting Modaber, 674 F.2d at 1025) (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 ed. & Supp. II); see
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). For a comprehensive analysis of the PLRA
including an explication of judicial interpretations of each nuanced element see John Boston, “The
Prison Litigation Reform Act” The Legal Aid Society Prisoner’s Rights Project (Feb. 27, 2006),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Boston_PLRA_Treatise.pdf.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). See also Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (noting that Congress passed the PLRA to limit the number of
suits brought by prisoners and improve the quality of the issues before the court in addition to
creating an administrative record).
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residential houses, and private prisons.209 Courts are authorized under the
statute to dismiss certain cases brought by prisoners:
The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.210
Courts have routinely applied this authority to medical malpractice
claims, and the case law is vast regarding the various elements of the
statute.211 Pursuant to the statute, a prisoner must exhaust all other
administrative remedies prior to bringing an action.212 The case law
surrounding “exhaustion” questions among other PLRA actions is nuanced
and complex.213 For the purposes of this article, the reader should be aware
that the statute was enacted to improve the quality of potential actions while
at the same time provide an opportunity for custodians to address
complaints by prisoners before seeking a judicial remedy.214
V. CONCLUSION
Prisoners at private hospitals are entitled to receive the same medical
care as any other patient in the general population. Because of additional
obligations of the government to oversee and ensure adequate health care,

209. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2013). Of note, “Prisoner” is defined in subsection (h) as “[A]ny
person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole,
probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2013). Several cases
have interpreted the scope of this definition to exclude both the deceased prisoner and relatives.
See, e.g., Rivera-Quinones v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 397 F.2d 334, 339–40 (D.P.R. 2005) (interpreting
the PLRA definition of prisoner to exclude deceased prisoners).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2013).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”). See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting that a prisoner’s
allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
213. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 529–30 (2002) (analyzing the exhaustion requirement
as it applies to the phrase from the statute “prison conditions” and noting that the meaning is not
immediately clear cut).
214. See Kathryn F. Taylor, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Administrative Exhaustion
Requirement: Closing the Money Damages Loophole, 78 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 956 (2000)
(noting that the law was passed to curb the dramatic number of frivolous lawsuits while also
mandating administrative remedies be exhausted before a suit is filed).
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the processes for assessing and treating prisoners are inherently encumbered
by additional administrative needs to ensure that rights are not being
violated at the same time the risks to the health care entity are mitigated.
The prisoner simply has the right to consent to their own medical care,
though the standard by which the penal system is accountable for ensuring
care is rendered is not the same as for the general population.215 Prisoners
are ethically entitled to donate and receive organ transplants;216 however,
the policy governing the extent to which this is allowed is state-by-state.217
Medical negligence is not enough for a prisoner to claim a constitutional
violation, though an individual malpractice claim is an option against a
private health care entity.218 In essence, for private hospitals and providers,
the standards by which they would be held accountable would vary
depending on the role at the time of health care delivery, and the type of
action the prisoner files.

215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra section III.A.
See supra section III.C.
Id.
See supra section IV.

